考虑信任的公私合作监管演化博弈分析:以新冠病毒医疗垃圾管理为例*

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2021.07.006

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 38-47.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2021.07.006

• 安全社会科学与安全管理 • 上一篇下一篇

考虑信任的公私合作监管演化博弈分析:以新冠病毒医疗垃圾管理为例^*

曹策俊^1,2 副教授, 朱彦青¹, 张帆顺³, 李小莉^**4 讲师, 杨琴⁵ 教授

1 重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院, 重庆 400067;
2 重庆工商大学重庆市特色农产品加工储运工程技术研究中心, 重庆 400067;
3 暨南大学管理学院, 广东广州 510632;
4 仲恺农业工程学院管理学院,广东广州 510225;
5 四川师范大学商学院,四川成都 610101

收稿日期:2021-04-10 修回日期:2021-06-10 出版日期:2021-07-28 发布日期:2022-01-28
通讯作者: ** 李小莉(1988—),女,湖南邵阳人,博士,讲师,主要从事应急管理、演化博弈等方面的研究。E-mail:lixiaoli@zhku.edu.cn。
作者简介:曹策俊 (1990—),男,四川南充人,博士,副教授,硕士生导师,主要从事灾害运作管理、应急物流、演化博弈等方面的研究。E-mail:caocejun0601@tju.edu.cn。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助(71904021);重庆市社会科学规划项目(2019QNGL27);重庆市自然科学基金资助(cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0164);重庆工商大学“应对重大突发公共卫生事件”专题研究重点项目(ctbuyqzx01)。

Evolutionary game analysis of public-private cooperative supervision considering trust:taking medical waste management generated from COVID-19 as example

CAO Cejun^1,2, ZHU Yanqing¹, ZHANG Fanshun³, LI Xiaoli⁴, YANG Qin⁵

1 School of Management Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;
2 Chongqing Engineering Research Center for Processing, Storage and Transportation of Characterized Agro-Products, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;
3 School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou Guangdong 510632, China;
4 School of Management, Zhongkai University of Agriculture and Engineering, Guangzhou Guangdong 510225, China;
5 School of Business, Sichuan Normal University, Chengdu Sichuan 610101, China

Received:2021-04-10 Revised:2021-06-10 Online:2021-07-28 Published:2022-01-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为提高政府与私人企业间的合作绩效,在构建未考虑与考虑信任水平的公私合作收益矩阵的基础上,提出相应的演化博弈模型,分析不同情形下政府与私人企业在新冠病毒(COVID-19)医疗垃圾管理中策略演化趋势。通过数值算例,对比分析未考虑与考虑信任水平的公私合作监管策略的演化轨迹,剖析惩罚成本对博弈双方策略演化轨迹的影响。研究结果表明:在新冠病毒医疗垃圾管理过程中,不仅需要考虑设计惩罚机制规避私人企业的机会主义行为,而且还需建立信任机制引导私人企业提供高质量服务,从而实现整体收益最大化的目标,进而促进整个系统的可持续发展。

关键词: 新冠病毒(COVID-19), 医疗垃圾, 公私合作, 信任水平, 演化博弈

Abstract: To upgrade performance of cooperation between government and private enterprise, corresponding evolutionary game models were proposed on basis of constructing public-private cooperation payoff matrixes without and with considering level of trust. Strategies evolution trend of government and private enterprise in managing medical waste generated from COVID-19 under different situations were analyzed. Through numerical examples, evolutionary trajectory of public-private cooperative supervision strategies without and with taking trust level into consideration were implemented, and impact of punishment cost on evolutionary trajectory of both parties in game was analyzed. The results show that it is necessary to devise a punishment mechanism to avoid opportunistic behaviors of private enterprise and establish a trust mechanism to guide private enterprise to provide better quality service for managing medical waste generated from COVID-19.It can make goal regarding maximization of overall profit come true and promote sustainable development of the whole system.

Key words: Corona Virus Disease 2019(COVID-19), medical waste, public-private partnership, trust level, evolutionary game theory

中图分类号:

X913.4

曹策俊, 朱彦青, 张帆顺, 李小莉, 杨琴. 考虑信任的公私合作监管演化博弈分析:以新冠病毒医疗垃圾管理为例^*[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2021, 31(7): 38-47.

CAO Cejun, ZHU Yanqing, ZHANG Fanshun, LI Xiaoli, YANG Qin. Evolutionary game analysis of public-private cooperative supervision considering trust:taking medical waste management generated from COVID-19 as example[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2021, 31(7): 38-47.

参考文献

[1] ZHANG Fanshun, CAO Cejun, LI Congdong, et al. A systematic review of recent developments in disaster waste management[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 235: 822-840.
[2] BROWN C, MILKE M, SEVILLE E. Disaster waste management: a review article[J]. Waste Management, 2011, 31(6): 1 085-1 098.
[3] 李思远, 胡喆. “隐蔽”防线上的阻击战-武汉医疗废物处理从“全线告急”到“日产日清”[N]. 中国环境报, 2020- 04-01(1).
[4] 宋叶, 宋英华, 刘丹, 等. 基于时间满意度和胜任力能力的应急救援队伍指派模型[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2018, 28(8): 180-185.
SONG Ye, SONG Yinghua, LIU Dan, et al. Earthquake emergency rescue teams assignment model based on time satisfaction and competence[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2018, 28(8): 180-185.
[5] LI Congdong, ZHANG Fanshun, CAO Cejun, et al. Organizational coordination in sustainable humanitarian supply chain: an evolutionary game approach[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 219: 219-303.
[6] 李小莉. 考虑声誉的公私合作项目监管演化博弈分析[J].系统工程学报, 2017, 32(2): 199-206.
LI Xiaoli. Game analysis of supervision and evolution of public-private partnership projects considering reputation[J]. Journal of Management Engineering, 2017, 32(2): 199-206.
[7] HABIB M S, SARKAR B, TAYYAB M, et al. Large-scale disaster waste management under uncertain environment[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 212: 200-222.
[8] BOONMEE C, ARIMURA M, ASADA T. Location and allocation optimization for integrated decisions on postdisaster waste supply chain management: on-site and off-site separation for recyclable materials[J]. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 2018, 31: 902-917.
[9] HU Zhihua, SHEU Jiuhbiing. Post-disaster debris reverse logistics management under psychological cost minimization[J]. Transportation Research Part B, 2013,55(9):118-141.
[10] 聂丽. 医疗废弃物暂存处选址的多目标渐进覆盖模型与求解[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2018, 28(7): 105-107.
NIE Li. Multi-objective incremental coverage model and solution for the temporary location of medical waste[J]. China Population, Resources and Environment, 2018, 28(7): 105-107.
[11] 蒲松, 夏嫦. 城市医疗废弃物回收路径的鲁棒优化模型[J]. 系统工程, 2018, 36(6): 117-123.
PU Song, XIA Chang. The robust model for urban medical waste recycling routing problem[J]. Systems Engineering, 2018, 36(6): 117-123.
[12] BALCIK B, BEAMON B M, KREJCI C C, et al. Coordination in humanitarian relief chains: practices, challenges and opportunities[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2010, 126(1): 22-34.
[13] MOSHTARI M. Inter-organizational fit, relationship management capability, and collaborative performance within a humanitarian setting[J]. Production and Operations Management, 2016, 25(9): 1 542-1 557.
[14] DU Lanying, QIAN Ling. The government's mobilization strategy following a disaster in the Chinese context: an evolutionary game theory analysis[J]. Natural Hazards, 2016, 80(3): 1 411-1 424.
[15] YANG Fan, YANG Qing, LIU Xingxing, et al. SIS evolutionary game model and multi-agent simulation of an infectious disease emergency[J]. Technology and Health Care, 2015, 23(S2): S603-S613.
[16] CHEN Yidan, SUN Lanying. Trust strategy simulation of corporation-NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory[J]. Kybernetes, 2017, 46(3): 450-465.
[17] 曹策俊, 刘桔. 灾害运作管理中应急组织决策建模方法综述[J]. 计算机应用, 2020, 40(7): 2 142-2 149.
CAO Cejun, LIU Ju. Overview of modeling method regarding emergency organization decision in disaster operations management[J]. Journal of Computer Applications, 2020, 40(7): 2 142-2 149.
[18] 曹策俊, 李从东. 基于数学规划的应急组织指派优化问题综述[J]. 系统仿真学报, 2021, 33(1): 1-12.
CAO Cejun, LI Congdong. Overview of optimization problems regarding emergency organization allocation based on mathematical programming[J]. Journal of System Simulation, 2021, 33(1): 1-12.
[19] FREDMAN D. Evolutionary game in economics[J]. Econometrica, 1991, 59(3): 637-666.
[20] 徐瑞华, 罗帆. 机场净空区无人机扰航监管演化博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2019, 29(5): 25-30.
XU Ruihua, LUO Fan. Evolutionary game research of supervision on unmanned aerial vehicle interference with flights in airfield clearance area[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2019, 29(5): 25-30.
[21] 袁宏永, 苏国锋, 付明. 城市安全空间构建理论与技术研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2018, 28(1): 185-190.
YUAN Hongyong, SU Guofeng, FU Ming. Study and application of architecture method and technology of urban safety space[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2018, 28(1): 185-190.
[22] 曹策俊, 李从东, 屈挺, 等. 救援物资跨区域调度双层规划模型-考虑幸存者感知满意度和风险可接受度[J]. 管理科学学报, 2019, 22(9): 111-125.
CAO Cejun, LI Congdong, QU Ting, et al. A bi-level programming model for relief trans-regional scheduling: taking into consideration survivors' perceived satisfaction and risk acceptability[J]. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2019, 22(9): 111-125.

考虑信任的公私合作监管演化博弈分析:以新冠病毒医疗垃圾管理为例^*

Evolutionary game analysis of public-private cooperative supervision considering trust:taking medical waste management generated from COVID-19 as example

PDF

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 11

编辑推荐

Metrics

本文评价

[1]	郭云龙. 基于SIR模型的机动车内传染病传播研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2021, 31(1): 173-178.
[2]	刘纪达, 康宁, 安实, 麦强. 双随机、一公开消防监管模式的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2020, 30(12): 133-140.
[3]	王伟, 王晓楠, 丁黎黎, 张文思, 张辉. 多部门协作下危险品运输监管的演化博弈[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2020, 30(10): 69-74.
[4]	徐瑞华, 罗帆. 机场净空区无人机扰航监管演化博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2019, 29(5): 25-30.
[5]	张攀科, 罗帆. 通用航空安全监管演化博弈的系统动力学仿真[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2019, 29(4): 43-50.
[6]	王新成, 孙继德, 张召普, 王海峰, 黄宇. 企业提供与建筑工人参加安全培训的博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2018, 28(7): 159-164.
[7]	刘钰欣, 栗继祖, 冯国瑞, 康立勋. 基于改进CPT的矿工HVB变化分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2017, 27(7): 13-17.
[8]	刘素霞，梅强. 中小企业员工安全参与行为演化路径研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2012, 22(2): 164-.
[9]	秦娟，梅强，刘素霞. 中小企业安全生产寻租行为的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2012, 22(10): 145-.
[10]	张羽，周国华，李延来，杨世军. 具有危险源性质的复杂系统安全行为演化研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2011, 21(7): 111-.
[11]	程敏，朱前程，董大旻. 基于系统动力学的建筑安全监管博弈研究[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2011, 21(12): 73-.